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BOOK REVIEWS
LAW AND REVOLUTION. Haroldj Berman. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press. 1983. Pp. viii, 657. $32.50 (cloth).
The James Barr Ames Professor of Law at Harvard's law school
advises the reader that he began writing Law and Revolution in 1938 while
a graduate student at the London School of Economics.' Some 558
pages of compactly printed text, to which 75 pages of footnote materials,
primarily concerned with canon and secular legal systems in Latin Eu-
rope circa the years 1000 to 1200 are annexed, evidence that this was
indeed the case. Harold J. Berman has dedicated this awesome work
product to establishing two propositions, which can be arbitrarily en-
capsulated in reverse order. One proposition is that the law which de-
veloped in Western Europe, whether of the civil or common variety, is
ultimately bottomed on the corpus of canon law that resulted from the
Gregorian Reformation. The second proposition is that the reconstitu-
tion of the Roman Catholic Church associated with the reign of Gregory
VII was in fact the primal revolution creating the jurisprudential main
theme of Western Civilization; the seemingly discordant notes sounded
by later revolutions have actually been counterpoint and variations
upon the theme of this primal revolution.
Part II of the book, titled "The Formation of Secular Legal Sys-
tems," describes the crystallization of the multiform rules of law existent
in Western Europe into systematic bodies of feudal, manorial, mercan-
tile, urban and royal law. Much of this material is descriptive. The
author is the first to admit that the pieces of his story are "well known to
specialists in various fields of history and law."12 It would be nice to
think that at least the material on the Norman Conquest and Henry 113
was common knowledge in the law schools. "There was a time not long
ago when a good lawyer was required . . . to know the story of the
development of legal institutions."'4
This is not the place to rehearse Professor Berman's extrapolation
of the evolution of feudal law between 1000 and 1200 under six cap-
tions: objectivity, universality, reciprocity of rights of lords and vassals,
participatory adjudications, integration, and growth.5 He is able to use
the six categories to structure a discussion of the "transformation of ma-
I H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 636 (1983).
2 Id. at 538.
3 Id at 434-59.
4 Id at 7.
5 Id at 303.
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norial custom into a system of manorial law' 6 and to illuminate the
evolution of mercantile law. 7 Urban law is analyzed under a five-fold
classification, however: its communitarian character, secular character,
constitutional character, capacity for growth and its integrity as a sys-
tem.8 Royal law, in its turn, emerged in the context of "a new type of
political community, the secular territorial kingdom, which had nine
significant characteristics." 9 Suffice to report, the author treats each de-
tail with the loving, tender care one would lavish upon a delicate flower;
it is with royal law and the new territorial kingdoms that we can begin
to appreciate the design of the garden as a whole.
Under royal law in 1200, the king was purely a secular ruler and no
longer the supreme spiritual head of his realm. Yet he was no longer
simply the marginal leader of a set of territorial magnates who collec-
tively held sway over a given area; he was ruler of all of the people
within the realm. His job was to maintain the peace and settle disputes
not only between magnates, but between lesser folk and even between
vassals and magnates. He ruled through civil servants, including profes-
sional royal judges, so that a royal bureaucracy had replaced the local
magnates in the structure of governance.
The king not only enforced the laws of the realm but made new
laws if the need arose.' 0 Even so, much of this secular law emulated
canon law. This was not altogether surprising given that canon law had
an established system to be drawn upon and that the bulk of the king's
professional advisers were themselves clerics." The point is, however,
that the king was busy doing all these things to create his own identity
because there had emerged a rival authority who already had a body of
law and a professional bureaucracy, the Bishop of Rome.
A murder in a cathedral may help us to understand this phenome-
non. "The conflict between Becket and Henry was essentially a conflict
over the scope of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; it was thus a paradigm of the
Papal Revolution, which established throughout the West two types of
competing political-legal authority, the spiritual and the secular."' 2 But
why a "revolution?" Professor Berman, like a good law professor, an-
swers this question by building a somewhat complicated conceptual lit-
mus.' 3 Let us attempt to discover whether the word is appropriate by
adopting another tactic.
Around the year 1000, neither church nor state in the modern sense
6 Id at 321.
7 Id at 341.
8 Id at 392.
9 Id at 408.
1o Id at 409.
11 Id at 274.
12 Id at 260.
13 Id at 18-23, 99-107.
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of those terms existed. The emperor or king was a peripatetic figure
constantly traveling about in order to impose some semblance of order
on his chief tenants and, perforce, his realm. Whatever the king's physi-
cal power, he gained an added psychological dimension because his au-
thority was sacred as well as secular. He was the vicar of Christ
responsible for the spiritual well-being of his subjects.' 4 Bishops were
often appointed by the king and, because of the lands of the monarch
they held, they were at least quasi-secular figures in the realm.1 5 Mar-
riage or concubinage was common among the village clergy; their local
roots limited their outlook. 16 "[T]here was as yet no separate, corporate,
organized Roman Catholic Church in the West, no unified legal entity,
but rather an invisible spiritual community of individual bishoprics, lo-
cal churches, and monasteries subordinate to tribal and territorial and
feudal units as well as to kings and emperor."'
7
By 1200, the Church of Rome had come to be "an independent,
corporate, political and legal entity, under the papacy."' 18 It "exercised
the legislative, administrative, and judicial powers of a modern state."' 9
"The clergy became the first translocal, transtribal, transfeudal, transna-
tional class in Europe to achieve political and legal unity. '20 The events
which surrounded this metamorphosis seem entitled at least to the ap-
pellation "revolutionary." These were the events that occurred between
the year 1075, in which Pope Gregory VII issued the Dictates of the
Pope, and 1122, which saw a semblance of papal-imperial accommoda-
tion reached with the Concordat of Worms. Between these two dates an
emperor stood barefoot in the snow at Canossa and a pope was captured
by imperial forces at Rome. 2 1
How could this new transkingdom quasi-state have come to be?
First, there was throughout the West apopulus christianus , 22 sick and tired
of the secular preoccupations of prince-bishops. Second, in 910, there
was a Cluniac reform which created "the first monastic order in which
all the monasteries, scattered throughout Europe, were subordinate to a
single head."'23 Indeed, here was "the first translocal corporation,"
which in some respects served "as a model for the Roman Catholic
Church as a whole."'24 Third, and now the plot thickens, a person
emerged who could mold people and model a new institution. Christo-
14 Id at 51.
15 Id at ii.
16 Id
17 Id at 69.
18 Id at 520.
19 Id at 113.
20 Id at 108.
21 Id at 94-99.
22 Id at 91.
23 Id at 89.
24 Id
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pher Dawson told us that leadership of the reform movement within the
Church "passed to younger men" who were prepared to act "at
whatever cost. Foremost among them was the archdeacon of the Ro-
man Church, the Tuscan Hildebrand, who . . . was elected Pope in
1073 as Gregory VII."'25 Professor Berman confines himself to the
description articulated by another scholar who painted the image of a
person possessed of "an overpowering sense of mission" and "the temper
of a revolutionary. '26
Thus it was the Roman Catholic church which first built a central-
ized system of governance and, perforce, created "a centralized and sys-
tematized law."127 Even so, the Church left secular governance to the
emperor, kings, and dukes, who coexisted with the Church on the same
territory. In their turn, these dominations and powers created the basis
of the modern state. Yet nothing of the sort would have happened un-
less the Papal Revolution had occurred, and this convulsion would not
have occurred had not there already come into being "a grass-roots
community of the faithful, a populus chrisiianus, extending throughout
Western Christendom. ' 2 The circumstances of this revolution illustrate
that, "Law spreads upward from the bottom and not only downward
from the top."'29
The canon law propounded by the Church Revolutionary reflected
then emerging theological beliefs at the heart of the movement. Echoes
of these beliefs can still be discerned in the mirror image secular law, of
which some still survives. For example, a convicted murderer who be-
comes insane after sentencing will not be executed until he regains san-
ity. "Why? The historical answer, in the West, is that if a man is
executed while he is insane he will not have had the opportunity freely
to confess his sins and to take the sacrament of holy communion. '30
Until the late eleventh century priests had not had the authority to
forgive sins: they could pray to God to do so. 3 1 Christians expected to
meet their God only at the Last Judgment, and Christ was important as
a symbol of this hoped for resurrection.3 2 At this time in the West, the
notion developed that the sinner had to suffer punishment for
unexpiated sins in purgatory before the Last Judgment. There was then
an intermediate judgment, and this was a decision that the ecclesiastical
authorities could directly influence. Priests acquired the authority to
25 Se C. DAWSON, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE 131 (Image Book
ed. 1958).
26 H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 94-95.
27 Id. at 553.
28 Id at 555.
29 Id at 556.
30 Id at 166.
31 Id at 71.
32 Id at 177-78.
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absolve sins.33 The Pope as vicar of Christ could grant indulgences
which would cancel the punishments due in purgatory; he had "jurisdic-
tion over purgatory."' 34 Because sin meant punishment in purgatory, the
significance of Christ was recast: he came to be seen "primarily as the
conqueror of sin. '" 35 "Thus the church came to be seen less as the com-
munion of saints in heaven and more as the community of sinners on
earth. '36 Gregory's amendment of the Nicene Creed conformed it to
this new outlook and signaled the schism between the Eastern and West-
ern churches.37
Professor Berman discerns that these events were to have unfore-
seen consequences of considerable concern to us. First, a prudent person,
who kept track of his sins and was careful to acquire forgiveness or store
up credits to shorten the period of punishment in purgatory, might hope
to show up at the Last Judgment in a fail-safe mode. Odd as it might
seem, a kind of careful accounting practice within the system might
make him free. "Man was beginning to take the center of the stage." 38
Second, this odd celestial accounting system, involving as it did a
balancing of sins and indulgences, tends now to distract us from some
crucial points. All sin merited punishment; ergo, all crime did. Crime,
like sin, was an offense against the order of things; tribute or retribution
had to be paid. These are notions central to the criminal law today.
However, of crucial importance was the belief that, punishment being
deserved, God would not go around willy-nilly forgiving sins. Sin, or
crime, merited punishment, so much so that forgiveness without some
form of penance (punishment) "would constitute a deficiency in jus-
tice."' 39 Even "God is bound by his own justice. '40 Thus we reach the
core idea underlying both canon and secular law: "justice-based-on-law
and law-based-on-justice, with mercy playing an exceptional role." 41
However, if God was bound by his own justice, kings had to be bound
by theirs. Thus implicated in the Papal Revolution was the idea of "a
state ruled by law, a 'law state' (Rechtsstaat). '"42
Critical to the law states that evolved after the Papal Revolution
was the fact that a number of disparate tribunals came to exercise juris-
diction and that tension resulted. Secular courts came to rival canon
tribunals, while within the secular world criminal, civil, and mercantile
33 Id at 172-73.
34 Id at 171.
35 Id. at 178.
36 Id.
37 Id at 105, 178.
38 Id. at 171.
39 Id at 179.
40 Id at 180.
41 Id at 196-97.
42 Id at 292.
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courts coexisted uneasily. "The same person might be subject to the
ecclesiastical courts in one type of case, the king's court in another, his
lord's court in a third, the manorial court in a fourth, a town court in a
fifth, a merchants' court in a sixth." 43 Thus it is that "the Western legal
tradition" was bottomed upon "belief in the existence of a body of law
beyond the law of the highest political authority" and has always in-
volved "autonomous legal systems . . . within the nation. '44
Yet to be appreciated is how much of his own self Harold Berman
reveals on these pages. First, there is thepersona of a classic law school
professor. Obviously his work posits "a time when what is known today
as a legal system-a distinct, integrated body of law, consciously sys-
tematized-did not exist among the peoples of Western Europe. '4 5 "In
1000 there was no professional legal scholarship. '46 In the wake of the
Papal Revolution came not only a new canon law, and its mirror images
in various bodies of secular law, but "a class of professional lawyers and
judges" together with "law schools."'4 7 Professor Berman describes the
first law school at Bologna,48 the scholastic method,49 and, ultimately,
the notion that "law" was actually a prototype of western science.50
Langdell fairly haunts these portions of the book.
Second, Professor Berman reveals thepersona of a humanist who has
witnessed the disappearance of the plurality of legal jurisdictions and
the erosion of belief in a coherent body of law above and beyond poli-
tics. Belief in the law's "structural integrity . . . its religious roots, its
transcendent qualities" 5 1 is being dissolved by cynicism. 52 Words have
come to disguise meaning: witness how "'public policy' has come dan-
gerously close to meaning the will of those who are currently in con-
trol."-53 "These are harbingers," Berman suggests, "not only of a 'post-
liberal' age but also of a 'post-Western' age."' 5 4 In his introduction Pro-
fessor Berman seems ready to adopt T.S. Eliot's pose55 and patiently
43 Id at 10.
44 d at 45.
45 Id at 49.
46 Id at 76.
47 d at 116.
48 Id at 123-27.
49 Id at 131-32.
50 Id at 151-64.
51 Id at 39.
52 Id at 52.
53 Id at 41.
54 Id
55 See Spender, In Eliot's Cave, N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Sept. 19, 1974, at 22:
[W]hen one reads Notes Towards a Definition of Culture, one goes away with the
feeling that he does not really believe there is the basis for any real culture in
contemporary society, and that he is only discussing all this out of a sense of
Christian duty or humility.
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wait the coming of a new dark age.56 Perhaps something in the Boston
air encourages this mood.57 As London before it, the Hub has had to
suffer the continued westward migration of economic, and, perforce,
political and intellectual dominance. Given a preference for the values
once associated with the concept of gentleman, the quality of life even in
academic communties in the East has become something of a dog's
breakfast. Professor Berman may have especial cause to grow wistful as
the haute bourgeoisie periodically romp through Langdell's corridors pre-
tending to be Bolsheviki seizing control of the decisionmaking process in
the Winter Palace. What are we to make of all this? Here is a superb
intellectual history which tells a plausible story about an upheaval in
Western society and, at the same time, tells us a great deal about the
technical law then coming into vogue. Each of us lives in a world we
half create so that, in the last analysis, the temporal "truth" of Professor
Berman's construct depends upon how closely it matches the parameters
of our own. I find the construct plausible, but I have also read Christo-
pher Dawson with pleasure. 58 It is doubtful whether the professional
historians will be so easily pleased by legal history rehearsed, as it were,
in the grand manner.59
Professor Berman balances his melancholic views of the future with
a frolicking conclusion. While the Introduction rehearses a contempo-
rary jurisprudential "crisis," 60 the concluding pages include a "refuta-
tion"6' of Karl Marx62and a critique of Max Weber.63 What has law-
trained64 Marx to do with a history of medieval ideas, the one weakness
of which may be its refusal to limn the bathos of the material conditions
in which the ideas arose?65 Everything, when one considers that Marx
and Berman are at loggerheads over the question whether Hegel should
stand on his feet or on his head.66 The law professor's whole effort is,
after all, bottomed on the notion ably put by John Lukacs, that "[w]hat
56 H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 33-41.
57 A "must" read is A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (Am. ed. 1981).
58 See C. DAWSON, supra note 25, at ch. 5.
59 Relevant here is an aside in a book review:
As Sir Lewis Namier once remarked to me, after a rather tense game of
snooker: Historical judgments mark the point at which the historian has
ceased to do his research. Their content is of little value in itself. If there had
been more than fifteen reds on the table, it is conceivable that you might not
have lost.
Christiansen, Dirty Dick or Good King Richard?, THE SPECTATOR, Sept. 10, 1983, at 21.
60 H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
61 Id at 544.
62 Id at 539-45.
63 Id at 545-52.
64 Id at 547.
65 Even in translation one can "feel" the horror of it all in the opening paragraph of G.
DuBY, THE AGE OF THE CATHEDRALS (E. Levieux & B. Thompson trans. 1981).
66 The curious might want to peruse F. ENGELS, Feuerbach and the end of Classical German
Philosophy, in MARX AND ENGELS: SELECTED WORKS 594 (Moscow ed. 1968).
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people think and believe is the real substance of their lives and of their
histories-and the material institutions of society are the superstructure
of that. -67 Yet, in the short run, it is the law-trained 68 Weber who
presents the real problem.
Professor Berman seems actually to be experiencing a variety of
religious experience when he describes the legal process which emerged
from the Papal Revolution. He believes that "scholastic jurists created a
legal 'science,' in the modern Western sense."' 69 A five-fold criteria en-
ables him to define science in its modern sense and to conclude that "the
scholarly researches and writings of the Italian, French, English, Ger-
man, and other jurists of the late eleventh, the twelfth, and the thir-
teenth centuries, both canonists and Romanists, constituted a science of
law."' 70 A science presupposes that its practitioners adhere to certain
intellectual standards of objectivity. 7' Where the spirit is willing, how-
ever, the flesh may be weak. Although judges and lawyers were not al-
ways able to live up to this ideal, the law teacher or legal scholar had to
set the example by adhering to this "scientific code of values."'72
One paragraph encapsulates the spirit pervading the whole enter-
prise, and it is a truly magnificent one.
The scholastic dialectic and consequently modern science, in-
cluding legal science, were produced by the contradictions in the his-
torical situation of western European society in the late eleventh and
twelfth centuries, and by the overwhelming effort to resolve those con-
tradictions and to forge a new synthesis. They were produced, above
all, by the revolutionary upheaval which separated the ecclesiastical
and secular jurisdictions and thus made the reconciliation of opposites
an acute necessity at virtually all levels of social life. A learned profes-
sion of jurists emerged in western Europe-first mainly in the church
and eventually, in varying degrees, in the cities and kingdoms-in re-
ponse to the need to reconcile the conflicts that raged within the
church, between the church and the secular authorities, and among
and within the various secular polities. Formed primarily in the uni-
versities, the legal profession produced a science of laws; that is, the
jurists constituted a community in which legal science was the expres-
sion of the community's reason for being. Through its science, the
legal profession helped to solve the contradictions in the social and
historical situation of western Europe by solving the contradictions
between that situation and the preexisting legal authorities. Legal sci-
ence was, in the first instance, an institutionalization of the process of
67 J. LuKAcs, THE LAST EUROPEAN WAR 527 (1976) (emphasis in original).
68 H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 547.
69 Id. at 151.
70 Id at 152.
71 Id at 155-56.
72 Id. at 157.
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resolving conflicts in authoritative legal texts. 73
During this formative era, this effort was seen as part of the larger effort
to reconcile God and man. "More than anything else, it was the new
vision of his own ultimate destiny that first led Western man to have
faith in legal science."'74
Max Weber's world was built upon the rock of politics instead of
Marxist economics; its fundamental tenet is the necessity for any society
either to be dominated or coerced. 75  This view ignores Professor
Berman's picture of a body of quasi-sacrosanct law distilling the soci-
ety's moral beliefs and a legal process dedicated to crystallizing customs
into law as these notions work their way up through the social fabric. 76
Law does not remain forever fixed in Berman's world; it gradually must
be adjusted to continue to reflect the community's own evolving beliefs.
A proper respect for tradition is crucial to the workings of this judicial
process. 77 Instead of Weber, one cannot help but think of Michael
Oakeshott's admonition that the "modification of the rules should al-
ways reflect, and never impose, a change in the activities and beliefs of
those who are subject to them, and should never on any occasion be so
great as to destroy the ensemble. -78
Professor Berman has written a superb memorial to the ideals
which exhilarated the Western world for a considerable time as the re-
sult of the Gregorian Revolution. Those ideals were based on "a fear of
purgatory and the hope of the Last Judgment. ' 79 The reader has now
to strum his or her own blue guitar and to reflect upon our own ep-
och.80 Ours is an age in which, if God is not dead, hell and purgatory
have been disestablished. There are few shared beliefs on this planet
Earth. "Three degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a meridian
decides the truth."8' We live in a nation which has become the leader of
the Western world, but ours is a multilingual as well as a culturally
tribal society. Government has become "a set of institutional arrange-
ments for imposing a bureaucratised unity on a society which lacks gen-
uine moral consensus."'82 We are ruled by a mild despotism imposed by
courts, agencies, and collective elites, in what has become an administra-
tive state. And so, this reader has to conclude that this truly magnificent
73 Id at 160 (emphasis in original).
74 Id at 164.
75 Id at 51-52.
76 Id at 556.
77 Id at 558.
78 M. OAKESHOT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS 190 (1967).
79 H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 558.
80 See W. STEVENS, The Man with the Blue Guitar, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WAL-
LACE STEVENS 165 (Vintage Book ed. 1982).
81 B. PASCAL, PENSEES 83 (Everyman's Library 1948) (This book is a collection of
"thoughts." The cited quote appears in thought number 294).
82 A. MACINTYRE, supra note 57, at 236.
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book is a last hurrah, if not a memorial in the genteel tradition, for a
world which exists today only in one's memory and which, in gentle
persons, may cause a moment of regret, as one would recall with nostal-
gia the grand decadence of the perished swans.83
E. F Roberts*
83 See W. STEVENS, Academic Dicourse at Havana, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WAL-
LACE STEVENS 142 (Vintage Book ed. 1982).
* Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, B.A. 1952, Northwestern
University; LL.B. 1954, Boston College.
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